3.1Values, functions, and norms

Solving conflicts between economic utilisation and environmental conservation of mires and peatlands in a rational way presupposes an understanding of the different functions and values at stake. As all norms of behaviour are based on a concept of "values", this section looks at values under the following headings:

• sub-section 3.1.1 examines the character of values;
• sub-section 3.1.2 reviews value categories;
• sub-section 3.1.3 discusses various positions with respect to moral values;
• sub-section 3.1.4 presents a detailed typology of functions;
• sub-section 3.1.5 discusses the relationship between values and norms of behaviour.

3.1.1 The character of values

At least three approaches to defining "values" can be distinguished:

• In the idealistic approach, based on ancient Greek philosophy, values are regarded as ideal and objective, independent of the real world. It is assumed that these values are known through a special faculty called "intuitus".
• In the naturalistic approach, values are regarded as objective properties of the object valued, independent of the person making the evaluation. Objects in the real world are considered to have inherent value, just as they have mass or velocity.
• In the preference approach, values are regarded as assigned properties, resulting from the preferences of the person making the evaluation. Each person is free to value objects as he or she feels about them. "Absolute" values do not exist. Beyond the so-called "universal" values on which everyone is held to agree (such as freedom, peace, fulfilment of basic needs, health) there are large differences in the values attributed to particular objects. These relate to what the individual regards as necessary to his or her survival, but are also influenced by the cultural background of the valuer. Consequently a great variety of preferences and value-standards exist, and, in the absence of other premises, none is considered "better" or "worse" than the others.

Most experts in value theory (axiology) currently support the preference approach. Several contemporary environmental philosophers defend the naturalistic approach. Followers of the idealistic approach are rare.

3.1.2 Categories of values

The various approaches give rise to the following categories of values:

• non-moral values:
• instrumental values
• eudaimonistic values
• moral values:
• intrinsic values
• Instrumental values are clear means to an end ("instruments"). Instrumental value is equal to function: the beneficial effect of an object on another object. Instrumental values or functions can be studied systematically by science and are therefore more objective than eudaimonistic and intrinsic values.
• Eudaimonistic values refer to objects with no other end than the enrichment of life and activities that are performed largely "for their own sake". They include such experiences as friendship, love and the enjoyment of beauty. These values may be considered as instrumental when observed from an evolutionary point of view (e.g. aesthetics can be seen as a rapid and integrated evaluation of a complex set of indicators), but the individual undergoing these experiences will consider them as "good in themselves".
• Objects that are to be respected as such, i.e. independent from everything else, are said to have intrinsic moral value (or "moral standing"). The existence of intrinsic moral values is logically included in the idea of a mean-end relationship since a chain of means (instrumental values) must come to an end at something which has value as such (intrinsic value). Outside nihilism, it is illogical to imagine a world of means without any final ends. Consequently the preference approach outlined in sub-section 3.1.1 has ultimately to identify objects with "intrinsic value", i.e. that deserve moral respect for their own sake.

It is therefore a central question to identify which objects have such intrinsic moral value, are ends in themselves, and to which human beings have moral obligations; and for what reasons.

3.1.3 Positions with respect to intrinsic moral values

Humanism represents the position that human beings, and only human beings, have intrinsic value. In its first principle "Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development", the Rio Declaration (UNCED 1992) takes a clear humanistic starting-point. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UN General Assembly 1948) attaches intrinsic moral value to all human beings, wherever they are. "Sustainable development" in seeking to meet "the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987) also attaches intrinsic moral value to human beings in the future. From the humanistic standpoint, all human responsibilities with regard to non-human beings are based solely on the realisation of human happiness.

To justify the humanistic position it is necessary to argue which characteristics of human beings are morally relevant. Non-humanists argue that any set of morally relevant characteristics which are shared by all human beings will not be possessed by humans only. They furthermore appeal to consistency: if human beings value a state (such as freedom from pain) in themselves, it is arbitrary and "speciesist" (as in racist, sexist) not to value it also in non-humans. In this way, intrinsic value is attached to different groups of beings with different characteristics:

• rational beings, who exercise reason or self-consciousness. This characteristic excludes some human beings (mentally disabled, severely demented, babies), although some of these are "brought back in" by referring to their potential rationality. A question arises, in a broad meaning of what rational behaviour is, as to whether this definition would include some animals, including great apes.
• sentient beings with the capacity to experience pleasure and pain. Pain is presumed to be bad, since every creature seeks to avoid or to minimise it. According to this position, the capacity for feeling pain gives sentient beings the right ("valid claim") that pain be not intentionally and needlessly inflicted upon them. Their capacity for pleasure gives them the right to pursue whatever pleasures and fulfilments are natural to beings of their kind.
• living beings. In this position, sentiency is considered not to be the basic criterion for attaching intrinsic value, since sentiency exists only as a means to another end: life. The World Charter for Nature (UN General Assembly 1982) affirms that "Every form of life is unique, warranting respect regardless of its worth to man."
• all beings.

Although intrinsic value is attributed to individual persons, intrinsic moral value can also be attached to groupings or systems, a position called holism. Such groupings or systems may include institutions (the "party"), nations (patriotism), the "land", forests, species, ecosystems, and even the whole biosphere. In some of these holistic approaches, individuals are not valued as such and may be sacrificed for the sake of the whole (e.g. species conservation in nature conservation). The Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCED 1992) explicitly acknowledges "the intrinsic value of biological diversity" and consequently attributes intrinsic value to both species (taxa) and ecosystems. It remains, however, unclear which features of "wholes" are considered to be directly morally relevant. People who distrust all boundaries must either attribute intrinsic value to every being simply because of its very existence (ethical holism), or to no being at all (nihilism).

Apart from the non-humanistic arguments mentioned above, various other arguments with strong metaphysical premises are used to attribute intrinsic moral value to non-human entities:

• theism: the argument that all beings are God, in the image of God, or created to glorify God.
• nature mysticism: the intuitive feeling of humanity's unity with all nature.
• holistic rationalism : the idea that this world is the "best" of all possible worlds, with a maximum economy of premises and fundamental laws, a maximum diversity of resulting phenomena, and its consistency, order, or harmony. Similar concepts include "the balance of nature", "nature knows best", and "Gaia" in environmentalism.

In summary, there is no universally accepted position with regard to intrinsic moral values.

In spite of differences on the level of ethical justification, there is some convergence at the level of practical conclusions and political recommendations, as similar conclusions can be reached from different premises. Most ethicists agree that all human beings and at least some higher animals (apes, dolphins, whales) have intrinsic moral value. All enlightened environmentalists and economists will agree that environmental and economic decision-making should take all kinds of values seriously into account. As intrinsic values normally can not be compromised, the different positions regarding which beings have intrinsic moral value will have an over-riding impact on how conflicts are judged, and may themselves be the main cause of conflict. If some participants in a conflict assume that the integrity of non-human beings is of intrinsic moral value, they will not accept solutions which other participants, who only look at their instrumental value, would interpret as fair and well-balanced compromises.

3.1.4 Types of instrumental values

In this sub-section a scheme of instrumental values is presented which not only applies to human beings, but - mutatis mutandis - also to other beings.

Instrumental values (functions, services, resources) can be subdivided into various types (see Table 3-1).

Material life support values contribute to the maintenance of physical health. They are usually divided into production, carrier, and regulation functions. Non-material life support values contribute to the maintenance of mental (and physical) health by providing opportunities for recreation, reflection, spiritual enrichment, cognitive development, and aesthetic experience. (From the subjective point of view, the latter can partly be called eudaimonistic values). Part of the non-material life support values only applies to rational and self-conscious beings, as they require a high level of abstraction.

All these functions have a future aspect as option or bequest values, which refer to what is left for future generations. Transformative/ educational values lead to a change of preferences. They only make sense, however, for those who believe that one set of preferences is better than another and that an objective scale of values exists.

Table 3-1: Types of instrumental values

3.1.5 Relationship between values and norms of behaviour

To resolve value conflicts in a rational way, normative principles must be identified and justified. For that purpose it is necessary to distinguish between values and norms. Whereas most people regard values as being rooted in preferences (3.1.1.), norms are generalised expectations of behaviour. Under democratic conditions, valid norms take the character of "mutual coercion set by mutual agreement": guidelines, conventions, and laws. This presupposes a setting in which people - in an open debate based on all information and reasons available - agree freely on restrictions on the realisation of individual preferences. Mutual agreements are to be made from the perspective of citizens who take a moral interest in public affairs while the coercion itself (norms, laws) restrict the behaviour of private persons who try to satisfy their preferences and economic interests.

Intrinsic moral values entail moral obligations. Any moral obligation can only be over-ridden by another moral obligation of higher importance (for example a person may be hurt in order to save his or her life). Intrinsic moral values lead to direct obligations ("to"), instrumental values to indirect obligations ("in regard to"). Indirect obligations necessarily presuppose direct ones. A person who rejects direct obligations to ecosystems might well accept obligations in regard to ecosystems because of their life-support values for beings with intrinsic moral value. A person who accepts direct obligations to sentient wildlife may also accept indirect obligations in regard to their habitats. Indirect obligations are sufficient reasons for moral consideration - all other things being equal.

3.2 ?Functions of mires and peatlands for human beings

In order to place them in a context of values and norms this section attempts (Table 3-2) to outline the beneficial properties of peatlands, their compatibility with continuing peat accumulation, their substitutability, and their significance in global, regional and local terms.

Table 3-2: